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Abstract
Despite of all progress in terms of computational power, communication bandwidth, and feature
richness, limited battery capacity is the major bottleneck for using the resources of mobile devices
in innovative distributed applications. Incentives are required for motivating a user to spend
energy on behalf of other users and it must be ensured that providing these incentives neither
consumes much energy by itself nor allows for free-riding and other types of fraud. In this
paper, we present a novel incentive system that is tailored to the application scenario of energy-
aware resource-sharing between mobile devices. The system has low energy consumption due
to avoiding the use of public key cryptography. It uses a virtual currency with reusable coins
and detects forgery and other fraud when cashing coins at an off-line broker. A prototype-based
measurement study indicates the energy-efficiency of the system, while simulation studies show
its resilience to fraud. Even in scenarios with 75% of fraudulent users that are colluding to
disguise their fraud only 3.2% of them get away with it while the energy overhead (about 3%)
for the incentive system is still moderate
Keywords and phrases incentive system; resource sharing; fraud detection
Digital Object Identifier 10.4230/OASIcs.KiVS.2011.109
1 Introduction
Current sales figures1 indicate a significant increase in the popularity of smart phones and
evidently show a trend towards feature-rich mobile devices. Besides offering computing and
storage resources almost comparable to desktop PCs ten years ago, such devices offer a
variety of other resources, including different communications capacities like 3G, WiFi, and
Bluetooth, as well as sensors for position, acceleration, light, and temperature. Combining
the resources provided by multiple devices enables new and exciting applications. These are
typically observed as a natural subset of pervasive computing [25] and find increasing interest
in many other disciplines of distributed computing, e. g., in Grid computing [10] and service
overlays [5]. Example applications range from pooling capacities of the cellular connections
of multiple devices to speed up downloads [3] to people-centric sensing exploiting the sensors
of thousands of smart-phones [8].
Unfortunately, despite of the growth in resource variety, processor speed, memory size,
and communication bandwidth, battery capacity remains the limiting factor for realizing
the vision described above [18]. Providing resources for applications running on remote
devices may consume a significant amount of energy, limiting the operating time of a mobile
device for the owner’s personal use. In fact, mechanisms are required to motivate device
owners—that are not known to each other in general and, thus, do not pursue a common
goal—to spend energy on behalf of others. Such mechanisms can be provided by incentive
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systems. These systems could recompense the energy spent for serving a remote resource
request, and allow to use the refund in turn to recompense others for using their resources.
Many incentive systems for motivating cooperation among users have been proposed with
different application scenarios in mind, e. g. MilliCent [20], NetPay [9], and Micromint [24].
However, most of them cannot be used to motivate resource sharing among mobile devices,
since they either require trusted hardware, connections to a central broker or other third
parties on each interaction that requires a refund, or utilize refunds that cannot be reused
without opening the door for fraud. An even more important drawback when it comes
to providing incentives for spending energy is that most systems consume lots of energy
by themselves, e. g., by requiring the use of public key cryptography on each payment,
contradicting the primary goal of the incentive system.
In this paper, we present an energy-efficient and resilient incentive system tailored to the
use-case of recompensing the energy required for resource sharing. For achieving energy-
efficiency, the system works entirely without public key cryptography. Nevertheless, it is based
on a virtual currency that can be exchanged between participants without communication
with a central broker or any other third party on each payment. An amount earned by
providing resources for a remote device can be re-used for consuming remote resources from
other devices. Multiple-spending of coins is persecuted by posterior fraud detection when
coins are cashed by an off-line broker.
We illustrate the main benefits of our incentive system—energy-efficiency and resilience—
in in-depth performance studies. By prototype-based measurements we show that using our
system increases the energy consumption only marginally compared to a resource-sharing
system that does not provide incentives. Furthermore, in a simulation study considering
different fractions of malicious users, we show that fraud can be detected with high probability.
Even in a worst case scenario with 75% of all participants being colluding malicious users
only 3.2% of them get away without being punished for their fraud for a short period of
time. These results clearly illustrate that the proposed system can successfully recompense
energy for servicing remote resource requests with low energy-consumption by itself and high
resilience to fraudulent users.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews existing incentive
systems with focus on the design goals energy efficiency and resilience. The concepts of our
incentive system are described in Section 3. Section 4 presents the mechanisms that are
applied for fraud detection when cashing coins at the off-line broker. Evaluation results with
respect to the energy consumption and the probability of fraud detection are provided in
Section 5. Finally, concluding remarks are given.
2 Requirements and Related Work
Subsequently we present a reference scenario to show the requirements that we hold necessary
to be fulfilled: Imagine a group of tourists gathering around a point of interest. Assuming
that their mobile devices advertise the resources they can provide in a MANET a camera
may add location tags to taken pictures by obtaining GPS readings from a nearby navigation
device. Beyond offering remote access to a single resource, a device can offer remote services
that combine multiple resources. For example, exploiting its GPS and WAN links a PDA
can offer a service for location-tagging and gallery-upload of a picture.
Providing such services is expensive in terms of energy. That is why there must be some
kind of incentive system that recompenses users who provide services to other users. Based
on the described scenario we see the following requirements for such an incentive system:
No need of trusted hardware: Incentive systems that depend on trusted hardware modules
are applicable only on a subset of the currently widespread mobile devices. The more
requirements an incentive system makes with respect to the using devices the smaller the
group of potential users will become.
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No need of always available central infrastructure: Long-living connections to central
infrastructure components via wireless WAN technology considerably decrease the battery
lifetime of mobile devices [14]. The incentive system itself should not be a major consumer
of energy itself.
No involvement of third party: Including a third party in every payment increases the
communication overhead considerably. Either an internet connection is needed every time
a user wants to consume or provide a service or the involved party must be nearby in the
very same MANET. Both assumptions are to strong restrictions for our use case.
Vendor-independent currency: Currency that can be used only to pay a specific vendor
restricts the usability in scenarios in which every participant is a potential resource
provider and consumer.
Reuse of currency possible: Currency that can be earned and spent several times allows
participants to achieve liquidity by providing services. So there is a real incentive to
provide resources and services.
No need of public key cryptography: Creation and verification of digital signatures as well
as de- and encryption of data using public key cryptography is a demanding task with
respect to CPU capacity.
Fraud detection possible: In case malicious users commit fraud it is a desirable property
of an incentive system, that the fraud can be detected and the initiator can be tracked
down.
There is plenty of related work on accounting and creating incentives in decentralized
networks. According to the classification presented by Obreiter and Nimis [12] incentive
schemes can be categorized into trade based and trust based systems. Examples and
discussion of trust based systems can be found in [16], [6]. As good reputation only gives
good return in settings with stable cooperation patterns [12] and our use case assumes flexible
and often changing cooperation patterns our approach is a trade based incentive system.
Subsequently we will explain in which aspects our approach differs from other trade based
incentive systems.
Buttyán and Hubaux [7] present an incentive system that stimulates cooperation in
MANETs by introducing a so called nuglet counter. This counter is incrementend whenever
foreign data is forwarded and decremented whenever own data is sent. As a positive counter
is required to send own data, there is a strong incentive to behave cooperatively. To avoid
users to manipulate this counter is is secured by a tamper resistant security co-processor.
Although this approach might be used for other resources than forwarding capacity as well,
the need for a trusted hardware module on each participating device contradicts our first
requirement.
Liebau et al. [19] propose a token-based accounting system for P2P-systems. Although
they provide a concept for accounting without central infrastructure their scenario differs in
an important point: As we focus on resource sharing on mobile devices it is most important
to us not to spend to much energy on the incentive system itself. Otherwise the accounting
and incentive system would not encourage people to share resources at all. As we want to
build an incentive system that is tailored especially to the needs of battery driven mobile
devices, we try to go without the means of public key cryptography. According to Rivest et al.
[24] the usage of public key cryptography for securing electronic currency is rather expensive
in terms of CPU load and thus also in terms of energy: They estimate that the computing
time needed for verification of an RSA signature is 100 times higher than computing a hash
function, generating an RSA signature takes even 10000 times longer than computing a hash
function.
Other payment schemes that apply public key cryptography are P-Pay [26], Sprite [27],
and the work by Blaze [4] and Abdelkader [1]. Another important difference is the value of a
token. The tokens proposed by Liebau et al. do not have any intrinsic value whereas each
coin that we use in our approach represents a fixed value. How this specific value can be
determined is discussed in Section 3.2.
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There are incentive systems that do not make heavy use of public key cryptography.
However, some of them do not offer a currency that can be used for several subsequent
payment operations. Millicent [20], NetPay [9], and Micromint [24] for example assume that
the means of payment are redeemed after a single payment. In our use case this would mean
that each participant must either possess a larger amount of electronic currency to maintain
liquidity for a sufficient period of time or that he must get small amounts of electronic
currency more frequently.
Bocek et al. propose a private and shared history-based incentive mechanism (PSH).
However, their approach is based upon an assumption that is fundamentally different
from ours: Bocek et al. assume that resource interests in the resource sharing system are
asymmetric, i. e. that an entity that provides a resource to another entity is not interested
in the resources that this one is sharing. In contrast we do not take that assumption but
hope that resource consumers also offer resources that are attractive to resource providers.
Besides, PSH also makes use of public key cryptography, which we do not for reasons that
are explained above.
In PeerMint [13] a decentralized accounting system for P2P applications is provided. In
contrast to our approach it tries to accomplish a system without any central component
whereas we rely on a central broker although this component of our system may be reachable
only casually. In order to guarantee high scalability and robustness it is built upon a
structured P2P overlay network. As we are considering use cases with only a small number
of users we do not base our approach on such a system that comes along with a considerable
communication overhead.
Another distinguishing feature is the scale of the incentive system. As our reference
scenario that was described before shows we are considering resource sharing in small
MANETs. This means that the cost for implementing large scale solutions as proposed for
example in [17] and [6] is not adequate.
3 An Incentive System for Resource Sharing in MANETs
Our resilient and energy-saving incentive system for resource sharing in MANETs uses
electronic currency to compensate resource providers for their efforts. We use the MicroMint
system [24] to create such "digital coins". A coin consists of a certain number of values that
create a hash collision when used as input for a certain hash function. It is very hard in
terms of computing time (and thus energy) to create such collisions but easy to verify if
certain values create such collisions. This means it is hard to create coins (even on strong
computing machines), but easy to check, whether a coin is valid (even on poorly equipped
mobile devices). There are a couple of techniques to vary the effort that is needed to create
valid coins. That way it is possible to make it unprofitable if not impossible to forge a
substantial amount of coins. The coins are generated on a central system, that has plenty of
resources compared to the mobile devices that are supposed to use the coins.
Coins that are constructed following the MicroMint approach are actually not made for
multiple payments. They are valid only for a specified amount of time and they are supposed
to be used only once. However, we see the option of using earned coins for consuming services
as a major motivation to provide services. Furthermore, redeeming the coins after using
them only one time would increase communication with the broker and would therefore
mean higher energy expenses. Thus, we developed a system that allows to use MicroMint
based coins in multiple payments. As this opens up several opportunities to commit fraud
for malicious users we also present a technique to track down fraudulent users. Thus, we
explore the design space that is spanned by the trade-off security vs. energy consumption.
In the remainder of this section we will clarify the assumptions that our work is built
upon before we give an overview on the entire system.
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3.1 Assumptions
Our incentive system and the technique for tracking attempted and committed fraud relies
on several assumptions that are reasonable with respect to the use case presented in Section
1.
Participants can be identified: Tracking down and punishing malicious users requires
a way to identify each user. In a lot of incentive systems this is achieved by digital
signatures that employ public key cryptography. As explained before, it is one of our
explicit goals not to use such techniques because of their high demand of computing
capacity and energy. Still we assume, that every participating device can be identified.
This can be done for example using pre-distribution of random keys like proposed e. g. by
Ramkumar et al. [21].
There is a central, trusted component: This component that is called broker subsequently
does not need a continuing connection to the resource providers and consumers, but
at least once in a validity period of the used coins. The broker is not involved in any
payment operation between a service provider and a service consumer. It only delivers
new coins at the beginning of a validity period and redeems coins at the end of a period.
There is a common schedule: All participants that want to take part in the fraud detection
system contact the broker within a certain time frame. This could be the first day of each
month for example. Participants that do not meet this deadline still can redeem their
coins, however they must accept not be recompensated if the coin has been redeemed by
a malicious user before.
There are means to invoice the transactions: Just in case that the virtual currency is
supposed to be bound to a real currency (which is not necessarily the case) we further
assume that the broker is able to bill and withdraw the according amount of money from
the participants account. Just as it is done for example by a cell phone provider. The
actual arrangement of this business process is out of scope for this paper.
Attacker model: Furthermore, we assume that malicious users cannot forge coins that
pass the validity checks run by each device before accepting a coin. This assumption is
reasonable as Rivest et al. [24] provide techniques that make the necessary efforts for
forging coins many times higher than the costs that the legitimate issuer of the coins has
to bear. Instead we consider malicious users that try to spend original coins several times.
We examine both cases, a single fraudulent user and colluding fraudulent users. A single
fraudulent user can try to conceal the fraud by forging transaction logs whereas a group
of colluding fraudulent users can even come to an agreement to incriminate a third party
of having committed the fraud. We assume such colluding fraudulent users to act in fixed
groups. We think this is reasonable as the most likely appearance of such a colluding
group is a person that owns serveral mobile devices that she configured to commit fraud.
3.2 Overview
The architecture of our system consists out of three major components: broker, service
consumer and service provider. Mobile devices might either act as both service consumer and
service provider or incorporate only one of the two functions. At least once in the validity
period of a coin (that might be a month, e. g.) service providers and consumers need a
connection to the broker. This can be done either through a wireless WAN interface or when
the mobile devices eventually gain access to the internet via WiFi-LANs. Then the mobile
devices can get new valid coins or redeem the ones that they earned for providing services.
Note that this requires only a sporadic connection between broker and participating devices.
Each coin represents a fixed, small monetary value. This could be 0.1 cent, for example.
Every time a mobile device wants to offer a service, an adequate fee for using the service is
also published within the service advertisement. As we want to recompense service providers
for their energy expenses, the price to pay for using a service should be related to its energy
cost. However, the value of energy for the user of a mobile device varies depending on usage
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Figure 1 Transactions between honest users. Node one and five standing for the broker’s
dispensing and redeeming part.
scheme, remaining battery charge and chances to recharge the battery. There are several
approaches in related work how the price of a service can be adjusted with regard to those
variable conditions, e. g. in [3].
As the price of a service is published within the service advertisement, a service consumer
can base the choice of provider on the announced service cost. On requesting the service,
the service consumer transfers the specified number of coins to the service provider. If the
service provider fulfills its obligation the service consumer marks the corresponding coins as
spent. If the service provider does not meet its duty the service consumer adds the provider’s
id to a blacklist. In case of a successful payment both participants create transaction logs. A
transaction log contains the unique id of all coins involved in the payment and the ids of
service provider and consumer. These transaction logs can be used for the posterior fraud
detection presented subsequently in Section 4.
4 Posterior Fraud Detection
According to the attacker model presented in Section 3.1 only multiple-spending of coins will
discussed in this work.
The only chance of detecting the reuse of already spent coins at user-level is, if the coin
already exists in the local coin set and a user wants to pay this user with the same coin. In
all other cases, fraud can only be detected by the broker after all coins have been redeemed.
Therefore every client saves a transaction log for received and spent coins including the
involved user-IDs. The transaction log is handed over to the broker when redeeming the
coins. If the broker detects that one or more coins are redeemed by more than one user,
he uses a graph built from the collected transaction logs. This graph is used for detecting
the fraudulent users. The nodes thereby represent the users, the edges the transfer of coins
(identified by their coin-IDs) between these users (as shown in Figure 1, e. g.).
Honest users, redeeming all received coins at the end of the validity period, should have
the same amount of incoming to outgoing edges, as shown in Figure 1. In this case we
call all edges verified as for all of them two congruent transaction log entries can be found.
Only fraudulent users or users trading with fraudulent users will show an imbalance or have
unverified transactions, where only one log entry for the payment can be found.
As a fraudulent user is willing to hide his fraud, he will likely manipulate his own
transaction log by either keeping only one of the entries for the multiple-spent coin or
adding bogus entries telling he received the coin multiple times. This manipulation leads to
notcongruent transaction log entries as shown in Figure 2. We call these unverified edges.
The broker scans the transaction logs for these unverified transactions and marks the
involved users. A naïve approach would be to only mark the users with outgoing unverified
edges as cheaters. Then two or more users could conspire to draw the broker’s attention on
another user as shown in Figure 3. In this example user 3 could hand over a coin received
from user 2 to node 4. Both colluding fraudulent users could delete the transaction log for
this transaction and create transaction logs that indicate that they received the coin from
user 2.
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Figure 2 Transactions including a cheaters (node 2) double spending of a coin. Node one and
seven depict the broker that is dispensing and redeeming the coins.
Algorithm 1 explains the tracking algorithm that is used to face the challenge of colluding
fraudulent users. If an unverified edge is detected, the user with the outgoing unverified edge
and all users receiving the involved coin from this user are marked as possibly fraudulent.
The user with the outgoing edge hereby gets a score of two, the users with the incoming edge
receive a score of one (line 5 and line 10). Considering the example from Figure 3 user 2 gets
a score of 2, users 3 and 4 get a score of one each. These scores were chosen with respect
to the thresholds used in Algorithm 2. A user must occur at least two times spending a
duplicated coin or three times receiving a duplicated coin before he is considered a malicious
user.
Thereafter the set of the receiving users (in our example this is {3,4}) is put into a list
of potential conspiratorial groups. If the group has been added before, its group score is
increased (lines 14 - 19). The score of the users and the group score is used to determine
whether a user is treated as fraudulent user or as victim of a conspiracy. How this is done is
shown in detail in Algorithm 2. A fraudulent user who spends a coin several times without
forging transaction logs will be caught as he has more verified outgoing transactions than
incoming transactions for the very same coin (lines 22 - 27). He gets a score of 3 (line 25)
which is higher than the COIN-FRAUD-THRESHOLD (=2).
Algorithm 1 Algorithm to detect fraud
1: for all coins in multipleRedeemedCoins as coin do
2: for all unverified transactions of coin as ut do
3: source = ut.source
4: if source has more than 1 outgoing transactions then
5: setScore(source, coin.id, 2)
6: possibleConspirators = new List
7: for all outgoing transactions of source as ot do
8: receiver = ot.receiver
9: if receiver has at least one outgoing transaction && getScore(receiver) == 0 then
10: setScore(receiver, coin.id, 1)
11: possibleConspirators.add(receiver)
12: end if
13: end for
14: if suspectedGroups.contains(possibleConspirators)) then
15: incrementGroupscore(possibleConspirators)
16: else
17: suspectedGroups.add(possibleConspirators)
18: setGroupscore(possibleConspirators, 1)
19: end if
20: end if
21: end for
22: for all verified transactions of coin as vt do
23: source = vt.source
24: if source has more outgoing than incoming transactions for coin then
25: setScore(source, coin.id, 3)
26: end if
27: end for
28: end for
The process of actually resolving the fraud is described in Algorithm 2: The marking of
multiple users as possible fraudulent requires the adoption of thresholds for the scores to
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Figure 3 Colluding cheaters (node 3 and 4) blame an honest user for the double spending by
forging history entries.
avoid bringing innocent users to justice. First, only if the score for one coin is above the
COIN-FRAUD-THRESHOLD (=2) for the user, he is regarded when reallocating the costs
of the excessive redemption (line 8). This means a user must be involved at least two times
into suspicious transactions before he is charged for a fraud. Users with a low score are
likely to be innocent while the probability of a fraudulent user is higher the more he is being
involved in unverified transactions for the coin.
Nevertheless a user whose score for all the coins is below the threshold could still be
fraudulent by just double spending each coin and hereby keeping a low score for each coin.
So the total score over all unverified transactions also has to be below a second threshold,
TOTAL-FRAUD-THRESHOLD (=4), before the user is marked as innocent (line 8). The
values for both thresholds provided good results, however, future work might show that there
are better settings. Generally higher values for the thresholds bear the risk of an increased
number of false negatives whereas lower thresholds increase the number of false positives.
After the broker’s detection of who of the users is fraudulent, he uses the scores of these
users to reallocate the values of the excessive redemption and debits their user accounts. The
amount a convicted user is held liable for depends on his score. So users that are more likely
to be cheaters have to pay more.
The broker maintains a list where he keeps a record of all frauds committed by the users.
When a user reaches a predefined limit he will be blocked out of the system. The blocked
users are regularly distributed to all other users, so a blocked user can not trade anymore
with the broker or any other users.
Note that Algorithm 1 can be easily parallized. This is important as checking the
transaction logs might become a bottleneck of the system. Future work will show whether
and how it is possible, to parallize or speed up Algorithm 2.
5 Evaluation
The evaluation of our approach was twofold: First, we examined how much energy is spent
for the actual payment. Related work states clearly, that systems based on hash functions
are cheaper than for example RSA signatures. Rivest et al. explain that hash functions are
about 100 times faster than RSA signature verification [24]. Still, it remains to show that
the energy cost of the incentive system is small compared to the resource sharing framework
itself. For this reason we did measurements to determine the additional energy overhead
caused by our incentive system.
Second, we analyzed how good the mechanism to detect fraudulent users actually works.
Both are critical issues with respect to user acceptance. The energy measurements were done
using a prototype whereas we did a simulative evaluation of the fraud detection mechanism.
5.1 Energy Consumption
The prototype [11] for measuring the energy overhead that is caused by the incentive system
consists out of two Nokia N810 devices. We implemented a resource sharing framework based
on OSGi [2, 23] and R-OSGi [22]. Resources and services that are supposed to be shared
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Algorithm 2 Algorithm to resolve fraud
1: //remove possibleConspirators from suspectedGroups if groupscore is below threshold
2: cleanSuspectedGroups();
3: for all coins in multipleRedeemedCoins as coin do
4: conspiracyDetected = false
5: totalScore = 0
6: fraudulentUsers = list of users with score > 0 for this coin
7: for all users in fraudulentUsers as user do
8: if getScore(user, coin.id) > COIN-FRAUD-THRESHOLD || getScoreForAllCoins(user) >
TOTAL-FRAUD-THRESHOLD then
9: score = getScore(user, coin.id)
10: if user is in suspectedGroups then
11: score = (number of possibleConspirators groups the user appears in for coin) * 3
12: conspiracyDetected = true
13: else
14: if conspiracyDetected && score < COIN-FRAUD-THRESHOLD then
15: fraudulentUsers.remove(user) // Delete innocent user when conspiracy is detected
16: score = 0
17: end if
18: end if
19: totalScore += score;
20: //User is below thresholds
21: else
22: fraudulentUsers.remove(user) // Delete fraudulent users below threshold
23: end if
24: end for
25: doubleRedeems = number how often this coin has been redeemed
26: ratio = doubleRedeems / totalScore
27: for all fraudulent users of coin as user do
28: valueToPay = round((getScore(user, coin.id) * ratio) + accRoundingError);
29: accRoundingError = ((getScore(user, coin.id) * ratio) + accRoundingError) - valueToPay;
30: end for
31: end for
as well as the broker and the software for doing the actual payments are implemented as
remotely accessible OSGi bundles. One of the devices runs a simple service that changes the
characters of a word from upper- to lowercase and vice versa. The service is advertised in a
wireless ad hoc network. The other N810 device acts as service consumer. It requests the
service and sends the needed number of digital coins to the service provider. The service
provider checks the validity of the payment and if there is no reason to complain it provides
the service. We used an SNMD [15] to measure the current drawn from the battery during
the process of providing the service and checking the validity of the coins. In each run of the
experiment the service was requested, provided and payed for 100 times. We conducted 10
runs of this experiment. The measured energy cost does not include the cost for redeeming
the coins. However, this occurs rather infrequently (e.g. once a month) compared to the
actual payment operations and thus it can be neglected.
As a reference point we repeated the entire experiment without doing any payment.
Figure 4 shows the electric charge that was drawn from the battery in these two experiments.
In average, checking the payment for valid coins adds an overhead in terms of energy of
about 3%. This is mainly due to a slightly longer runtime (in average 4.54%). Note, that the
relative overhead will become much smaller for services that consume more energy than our
modest dummy service. So the 3% overhead can be seen as an upper bound for the overhead
that is caused by our incentive scheme. The fact that there are even some runs with payment
that consume less energy than some of the runs without payment shows, that the overhead
of the payment system in fact is very small. Obviously it can be outweighed by other factors
that are not related to the incentive system, e. g.background processes scheduled by the
operating system or necessary retransmissions due to a busy WiFi channel.
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Figure 5 Detection rate of single fraudulent
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Fraud detection for double spending
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
5% 25% 50% 75%
Fraction of fraudulent users
P
a
r t
i c
i p
a
n
t s
honest, correct fraudulent, correct
honest, false positive fraudulent, false negative
Figure 6 Detection rate of conspiratorial fraud-
ulent users.
5.2 Fraud Detection
The effectiveness of our technique for posterior fraud detection was analyzed in simulations.
The simulations were done with an event based simulator written in Java. In each run 100
participants did 1000 payments in total with a randomly chosen transaction partner. The
fraction of fraudulent users was set to 5, 25, 50 or 75 percent. In each configuration we did 10
runs with different random seeds. We did the entire experiment twice, once for the attacker
model of a single malicious user that tries to use his coins more than once, and a second
time for a more powerful attacker that is able to cooperate with other malicious users. Such
collusive participants can try to spend coins multiple times and both blame a third party,
that is actually innocent.
After each run the broker did its graph based fraud detection using the transaction logs
provided by the service providers and consumers. The results of the fraud detection process
were compared to the actual behavior of the users and each decision that was taken by the
broker was classified to be one of the following:
honest, correct: An honest participant was correctly detected as an honest user.
fraudulent, correct: A fraudulent participant was correctly detected as a fraudulent user.
honest, false positive: An honest participant was wrongly detected as a fraudulent user.
fraudulent, false negative: A fraudulent participant was not detected.
Figure 5 shows the results in case that fraudulent users act on their own and do not
collude. Our key finding from this result is that the number of malicious participants that
are not detected by the broker is close to zero (0.6% in average). As malicious users hardly
have any chance to get away without being punished there is only little appeal to behave
badly.
Figure 6 shows even better results for groups of collusive cheaters. Fraudulent users
colluded in teams of two, spent coins multiple times and blamed a third, innocent user for it.
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They are detected, because they appear several times as a suspicious group, according to the
assumption presented in Section 3.1. The broker and its detection mechanism work pretty
well. Less than 5% of the users are classified wrong, even in the worst case scenario with
75% of fraudulent users. A substantial amount of wrong classifications is due to colluding
malicious users that did not spend a coin twice but were involved in blaming an innocent
user. Such users are often detected as cheaters and this decision is considered to be a false
positive, here. If this was not the case the rate of wrong detections would even be lower
(2.4% of all users in the case of 75% fraudulent users). Relating to the number of fraudulent
users this means that 3.2% of the cheaters get away.
6 Conclusion and Outlook
In this paper we argued that resource sharing systems for MANETs lack an incentive system
tailored to this specific use case. Our approach provides the means to recompense service
providers for the energy they spent on service provision. As neither public key cryptography
nor communication with a third party is needed on each payment we could eliminate two
major drivers of energy costs. This results in only very little additional energy consumption
(< 3%) caused by our incentive system as shown by prototype measurements. Although the
abandonment of powerful cryptographic tools and the reuse of currency create opportunities
for abuse we showed through simulations that almost all malicious users can be tracked down
by our system for posterior fraud detection by an off-line broker. In a worst case scenario
with 75% of the users being cheaters only 3.2% of them get away without being caught.
This proves that it is possible to build an incentive system that suites the needs of resource
sharing in MANETs: being cheap with respect to its energy consumption and still effective
on preventing abuse.
In the near future we plan to compare the energy consumption of our incentive system
to solutions that apply digital signatures for payment transactions. Further we want to
investigate on how to further decrease the number of false positives in our fraud detection
system.
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